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Some deficits in the legislative 
framework
Abstract
The best-interest-of-the-child concept should guide the legislative 
framework with regard to the approach followed as well as the 
disciplinary processes used in schools. Currently schools revert 
mostly to a retributive and adversarial approach to discipline that 
is not compatible with the best-interests-of-the-child standard. 
In this article, the provisions of section 8 of the Schools Act are 
scrutinised and it is concluded that these provisions are supporting 
an adversarial and punitive approach to school discipline. This 
is evident from the lack of prescriptions ensuring that sanctions 
serve the best interest of children, the insufficient provision for 
support measures and structures for counselling, the undue focus 
on the best interests of the transgressor and the lack of guidance 
concerning the appointment of an intermediary. The introduction 
of restorative discipline as an alternative approach to discipline is 
recommended. The latter approach is recommended, because it 
is submitted that amendments to the existing legislative provisions 
would not address the key objection to the legislative framework 
namely its retributive and adversarial character.
Key words: adversarial, retributive and punitive discipline; best 
interests of the child; restorative discipline; school discipline; 
support measures and structures for counselling.
1. Introduction
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(“Constitution”) provides, in section 28(2), that a ‘child’s 
best interests are of paramount importance in every matter 
concerning the child.’ In line with this injunction, the new 
Children’s Act 38 of 2005 (“Children’s Act”) and the Child 
Justice Act 75 of 2008 have developed a clear focus on the 
best interests of the child. In addition, several Constitutional 
Court judgments, in particular, S v M 2007 (2) SACR 
539 (CC):24, elevated the best interests of the child to a 
constitutional right and have emphasised the need to give 
focused attention to these interests in all matters concerning 
the child. (See also Minister of Welfare and Population 
Development v Fitzpatrick and Others 2000 (7) BCLR 713 
(CC): par 17-18; Christian Education South Africa v Minister 
of Education 2000 (10) BCLR 1051 (CC):par 41; Sonderup 
v Tondelli and Another 2001 (1) SA 1171 (CC):par 29; 
De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions, Witwatersrand 
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Local Division, and Others 2004 (1) SA 406 (CC):432; Du Toit and Another v Minister of 
Welfare and Population Development and Others (Lesbian and Gay Equality Project as 
Amicus Curiae) 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC):par 22).
One might argue that heeding this principle is nowhere more crucial than in constructing 
and implementing the school discipline regime. However, as will be shown, the same vigorous 
adherence to the best-interests-of-the-child constitutional obligation present in other child-
related contexts, is not as conspicuous in the legal framework governing school discipline, in 
particular the South African Schools Act 84 of 1996 (“Schools Act”). 
2. Problem statement and aim
Discipline in the school educational setting should be understood as part of a teaching and 
learning process with two distinct aims. These are to create an orderly environment conducive 
to teaching and learning to enable the holistic development of every learner and to teach 
learners to behave in a socially responsible manner and to develop self-discipline, which 
ultimately, will result in respect for the rights and needs of others (United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, a 29; Hanberry 2009: 18; Reyneke, 2013:47). Not only should 
all disciplinary measures achieve the abovementioned two aims of education, but as noted 
above, they should also meet the constitutional imperative that the child’s best interests are 
of paramount importance in every matter that concerns the child (Constitution, 1996: s 28[2] 
and [3]).
Despite several amendments to the Schools Act, it still suffers from serious defects when 
measured against the child’s best-interests standard. In particular, this is evident from the 
lack of explicit prescriptions ensuring that disciplinary sanctions serve the best interests of 
the child; insufficient provision for support measures or structures for counselling; a narrow 
focus on the position of the transgressor; insufficient regulations to ensure the effective use of 
an intermediary during disciplinary hearings and failure to provide for exemption procedures. 
It will be argued that the above-mentioned defects ultimately stem from the fact that the 
school discipline regime is still essentially legislatively premised and practically enforced in the 
majority of South African schools from a retributive (or punitive) perspective and in terms of 
an adversarial process. (Burton, 2008:28-30; De Wet, 2003:116; SAHRC, 2008:13; Wolhuter 
& Van Staden, 2008:396). 
The aim of this article is to highlight the shortcomings of the existing provisions of section 
8 of the Schools Act and to recommend further amendments to align the Schools Act properly 
with the latest constitutional imperatives and developments related to the best-interests-
of-the-child standard. In particular, the advantages of approaching school discipline from a 
restorative justice perspective will be considered. The need to address the current defects and 
to find non-retributive alternatives is also highlighted by research that indicates how current 
punitive measures actually increase aggressive and other forms of unacceptable behaviour in 
schools (Gonzales, 2011; Ofer, 2011; Sprague, 2014).
The background theoretical framework will be drawn from recent conceptualisations of 
transformative constitutionalism. The analysis will rely on a literature study focusing mostly 
on the provisions of the Constitution, section 8 of the Schools Act and case law where 
appropriate. After explaining the notion of transformative constitutionalism, a brief indication 
of the conceptual contours of the best-interest-of-the-child right will be given. The retributive 
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and adversarial features of the school disciplinary process will then be elucidated. Thereafter, 
the most important shortcomings of the legislative framework, when measured in terms of the 
best-interests-of-the-child principle, will be identified. In short, these shortcomings relate to 
aspects of the discipline regime that do not fully respect, protect, promote and fulfil learners’ 
right to education, dignity, equality, personal security, education, social services and fair 
administrative action. In order for the law to be able to play its full part in addressing the 
multiple issues related to school discipline, the defects in school legislation need to be suitably 
remedied. In the concluding section, we indicate, in broad terms, a different approach to 
school discipline that could address most of the structural deficits of the current retributive and 
adversarial disciplinary system.
3. Conceptual framework
Hailbronner (2017: 2) indicates that there is a multitude of versions of the notion of trans-
formative constitutionalism, but it is generally accepted that Karl Klare did the ground breaking 
theoretical work. He defined transformative constitutionalism as follows:
By transformative constitutionalism I mean a long-term project of constitutional 
enactment, interpretation, and enforcement committed (not in isolation, of course, but 
in a historical context of conducive political developments) to transforming a country’s 
political and social institutions and power relationships in a democratic, participatory, and 
egalitarian direction. Transformative constitutionalism connoted an enterprise of inducing 
large-scale social change through nonviolent political processes grounded in law. I have 
in mind a transformation vast enough to be inadequately captured by the phrase ‘reform,’ 
but something short of or different from ‘revolution’ in any traditional sense of the word. 
(Klare, 1998: 150)
Former Chief Justice Pius Langa linked the concept with the Epilogue of the Interim 
Constitution, which depicts the Constitution as a normative roadmap to lead 
a deeply divided society characterised by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice, 
… [to] a future founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful 
co-existence and development opportunities for all South Africans, irrespective of colour, 
race, class, belief or sex. (In Langa, 2006: 352)
The Epilogue highlights the ideal that the Constitution is the beacon of hope and ultimate 
benchmark to address the injustice of the past, to heal the nation and to give guidance on how 
to secure a better future. Transformative constitutionalism encompasses the notion that the 
Constitution should play a determinative role in bringing about fundamental social and political 
change to improve the lives of people. (Hailbronner, 2017:7). Transformative constitutionalism 
captures the reality that transformation is a continuing process to define, refine and improve 
on the goals and imperatives set by the Constitution (Langa, 2006; 354; Hailbronner, 2017: 
7). There will always be something more that can be done to respect, protect, promote and 
fulfil human rights even further. The state is obliged to play an active role in this process. For 
present purposes in particular, the notion of transformative constitutionalism requires reflexion 
on the transformative implications of the best-interests-of-the-child standard, captured in 
section 28(2) of the Constitution, for current school discipline laws and practices. 
Transformative constitutionalism aims at establishing a society firmly rooted in the 
democratic values of human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of 
human rights and freedoms (Constitution, 1996: s 1[a]). It also aims to ensure that there is 
a move away from “a culture of authority” to a “culture of justification – a culture in which 
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every exercise of power is expected to be justified” in terms of these founding values of the 
Constitution (Langa, 2006: 353). This justificatory burden applies to the decisions of all those 
who exercise authority in the educational setting, from the legislature, executive and judiciary 
to the functionaries of a particular school (Constitution, 1996: s 8[1] and [2]). 
This implies, as Langa (2006: 357) indicates, that to give proper effect to the demands of 
transformative constitutionalism, one should realise that:
At the heart of a transformative Constitution is a commitment to substantive reasoning, to 
examining the underlying principles that informs laws themselves and judicial reaction to 
those laws. Purely formalistic reasoning tends to avoid that responsibility. 
It is therefore imperative to investigate the underlying principles or philosophies that underpin 
the existing legal provisions and practices with regard to school discipline, in particular the 
still prevailing retributive and adversarial nature of the disciplinary process. It will be argued 
that although not all the shortcomings of the school disciplinary system, when measured 
against the best-interests-of-the-child standard, cannot be attributed to it, the retributive and 
adversarial nature of the disciplinary process is a core contributory factor. Before the detail 
of the shortcomings is discussed, it is necessary to briefly consider the best-interest-of-the 
child standard.
4. The best-interest-of-the child standard
Although it is impossible and undesirable to define the best interests of the child precisely 
and exhaustively, it can be useful if it is attributed some core meaning. In Director of Public 
Prosecutions, Transvaal v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others 
2009 (4) SA 222 (CC): par 73 the court held in this regard:
It is, as we put it in Sonderup, “an expansive guarantee” that a child’s best interests will be 
paramount in all matters concerning the child. This provision thus imposes an obligation 
on all those who make decisions concerning a child to ensure that the best interests of the 
child enjoy paramount importance in their decisions. Section 28(2) provides a benchmark 
for the treatment and the protection of children.
The approach followed by the courts thus far in adjudicating matters involving the best-
interests-of-the-child is in line with the principle that all constitutional rights are mutually 
interrelated and interdependent and form a single constitutional value system (De Reuck v 
Director of Public Prosecutions, Witwatersrand Local Division, and Others 2004 (1) SA 406 
(CC):432; S v M 2007 (2) SACR 539 (CC): par 26). 
The interrelatedness of the best-interests-of-the-child concept and the right to education is 
explained by the Constitutional Court in Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School 
and Others v Essay NO and Others (Centre for Child Law and Another as Amici Curiae 2011 
(8) BCLR 761 (CC) . The court found that the closure of a public school located on private 
property owned by a trust is unconstitutional despite the fact that the Department of Education 
failed to pay rent for the use of the private facilities. The court held that the closure of the 
school must be postponed until every child in that school was admitted to another school, 
since closure of the school would infringe on the learners right to education and is not in their 
best interests. The children’s best interests had to be given preference to the property rights 
of the trust. 
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Section 8(1) of the Children’s Act makes provision for additional children’s rights that 
are not contained in the Constitution. These rights supplements the constitutional rights 
contained in section 28 of the Constitution. One of these rights is the child’s right to participate 
in proceedings where decisions will be taken that will affect the child (Children’s Act: s 10). 
In MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay and Others 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) the court 
emphasised the importance to prepare the child for responsible adult life and respect for 
human rights by expecting learners who want to be exempted from school rules to motivate 
why they should be so exempted. In this case the court also highlighted the importance of 
children’s right to dignity, non-discrimination, the right to be heard as well as their right to 
practice their religion. The same sentiments are found in Director of Public Prosecutions, 
Transvaal v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others 2009 (4) SA 222 
(CC), where the Constitutional Court held as follows with regard to the role of Constitutional 
values in the interpretation of section 28(2):
Section 28(2) must be interpreted so as to promote the foundational values of human 
dignity, equality and freedom. These founding values are given effect to in the Bill of 
Rights, which is the cornerstone of our constitutional democracy. Section 28(2), which 
is part of the Bill of Rights, protects the dignity of the child and advances the child’s 
equal worth and freedom by proclaiming that “[a] child’s best interests are of paramount 
importance in every matter concerning the child”.
Although the Constitutional Court therefore often refers to other constitutional rights when 
considering whether a specific decision, conduct or provision is in the best interests of the child, 
there are also instances where the courts interpreted section 28(2) of the Constitution as a self-
standing right. This means that even if the courts do not refer to any of the other rights in the 
Constitution, it can still find that conduct, decisions or legislative provisions are unconstitutional 
by simply finding that it is not in in line with the best-interest-of-the-child standard. 
5. The retributive and adversarial nature of school disciplinary 
processes
The retributive approach to wrongdoing or crime has its roots in ancient history and Biblical 
times where people lived by the maxim ‘an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth” (Fish, 2008; 
Gerber and Jackson, 2013: 62; Collica-Cox and Sullivan, 2017:43). Individuals were 
responsible to seek their own justice. From about the eleventh and twelfth centuries the State 
started to intervene and notions such as settling scores, revenge, vengeance, retaliation were 
tempered with the development of ideas such as proportional punishment and just deserts. 
In ancient times, the focus of the justice process was to ensure that the individual receives 
justice. The focus was thus on the victim of the wrongdoing. However, as the state’s role in the 
justice process increased the focus gradually moved from the needs and interests of the victim 
to the transgressor (Redekop 2008; Fish 2008; Bedau, 1978). During the inception of this 
transition from focusing on the victim to focusing on the transgressor, the state only assisted 
individuals in the justice process by providing investigation services. Later the services of 
an independent third party were made available to give impartial judgements only when 
community members brought their claims to the courts. However, over time, this changed and 
eventually courts could act on its own accord without complaints being received directly from 
community members (Redekop, 2008). As state power increased, the needs and interests of 
the victim decreased even further in the criminal justice process and crime or wrongdoing was 
considered a crime against the king or state (Redekop, 2008). 
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The state thus inserted itself into the adversarial process where the parties to wrongdoing 
no longer were in a position to resolve their own conflicts or have the harm done addressed in a 
way that focused on the needs and interests of the victim. Ultimately, the State took full control 
of the criminal justice process by making the laws, enforcing the laws, investigating crimes 
and eventually presiding over the proceedings in a formal trial and sentencing proceedings 
in a court. Sentencing takes the form of some punishment so that transgressors can pay 
their dues to society. The state decides not only who is guilty of what, but also what would 
constitute a reasonable punishment for breaking the rules (Margrain & Macfarlane, 2011:19). 
To address wrongdoing against members of the community thus became institutionalised and 
it is up to the State to decide on the process and the outcome 
The retributive approach used by the state to deal with crime became part of the way 
wrongdoing is addressed in other spheres of life as well. This historically ingrained system is in 
most instances also used by parents and by schools to maintain discipline. In this context, the 
retributive approach is premised on the idea that in order to learn from their mistakes and to be 
taught respect for rules children need to be punished consistently (Collica-Cox and Sullivan, 
2017:44). Other terms normally associated with this form of school discipline include “punitive 
discipline” (Oosthuizen, Wolhuter & Du Toit, 2003:469-470); “corrective discipline” (Joubert 
& Prinsloo, 2008:107); and “authoritarianism” (Reyneke, 2013). It displays clear parallels 
with the traditional punitive aims of punishment found in the criminal justice system namely 
retribution, revenge, deterrence and rehabilitation. General features of a retributive approach 
to discipline include authoritarianism, dominance, control, and power relations. This is evident 
from the powerful position educators hold and are in a position where they can make the 
school or classroom rules on their own without consulting learners, decide who transgressed 
the rules and what an appropriate punishment will be. Since they are in a position of authority, 
they can control the whole discipline process. Actions against transgressors are reactive in 
nature, focusing on establishing guilt for the breach of school rules, with the conventional 
aims of punishment guiding the imposition of penalties (Aull, 2012:179-180; Bloomenthal, 
2011:303-304; Morrison & Vaandering, 2012:140). 
Toews (2006:17) and Hanberry (2009:16) summarises the retributive approach by stating 
that it focuses on the following three questions: Which rule was broken? Who broke it? What 
is an appropriate punishment for breaking the rule? The needs and interests of the victims or 
those harmed by the misconduct are not included in the primary focus of the process. 
These retributive roots is clearly visible where disciplinary hearings are held by the school 
governing body (SGB) or its disciplinary committee in terms of section 8 of the Schools Act.
Although some schools have also implemented positive disciplinary measures, once a 
learner commits an act of serious misconduct, formal disciplinary proceedings will normally 
follow. The SGB is responsible for conducting disciplinary proceedings in instances of serious 
misconduct. These proceedings must comply with strict procedural prescriptions, focusing on 
the rules of natural justice, administrative fairness, strict time frames, and on prescriptions 
as to how to conduct a hearing (Hopkins, 2002:145). Sections 8 and 9 of the Schools Act 
envisage that these disciplinary proceedings will be adversarial in nature because the terms 
typically used in an adversarial criminal court context are used to depict the key features of 
the process. These include: “witness”, “testify”, “evidence”, “examination, cross-examination 
and re-examination”, “fair hearing”, “found guilty”, and “appeal against a decision”. A provision, 
similar to that of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 concerning the appointment of an 
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intermediary is also included. This reinforces the impression that these proceedings are very 
similar to court procedures. 
In recognition of the fact that disciplinary proceedings are substantially adversarial 
in nature, the legislator added and refined some protective measures in 2002 through the 
Education Laws Amendment Act 50 of 2002, and in 2007 through the Education Laws 
Amendment Act 31 of 2007. The aim of the amendments was to assist and protect learners 
involved in disciplinary proceedings. However, this did not change the retributive nature of the 
process, as will become more evident in the discussion that follows. The analysis will inform 
the conclusion that the existing provisions of the Schools Act are not in the best interests 
of children. 
6. Lack of prescriptions ensuring that sanctions serve the best 
interests of the child 
The educational deficits of a disciplinary process with a mainly punitive focus are nowhere 
more clear than in the non-alignment of sanctions with the constitutional best-interests-of-the-
child standard. Despite strict procedural prescriptions regarding the suspension and expulsion 
of learners, there are no provisions as to what should happen to the learner while he or she 
is suspended or awaiting expulsion. (Cf Schools Act: s 9) In practice, this will mean that 
suspended learners or learners awaiting the decision of the MEC on their expulsions will 
not be attending school, but will be legally staying at home. No legislative prescriptions state 
that these learners should attend; for instance, anger management classes or counselling 
sessions. Thus, they are out of school for some time, and then where applicable, return to 
school, the same school or to another school without any obligatory intervention to address 
the underlying problems or to enhance their best interests. 
Without any rehabilitation programmes attached to the suspension, the latter can only be 
regarded as purely authoritarian, punitive and retributive in nature. The underlying premise 
is that improper behaviour at school deserves being excluded from the school society. It is 
reminiscent of the retributive criminal justice system where offenders are removed from society 
when sentenced to jail. The exclusion from society and the accompanying stigmatisation 
should then deter criminals from reoffending. The only difference is that prisoners are exposed 
to rehabilitation programmes while they are incarcerated. When suspension is not attached 
to adequate rehabilitation or support programmes, it serves only to punish transgressing 
learners. Troubled children need help, yet what the law requires and what is offered in practice 
- as we shall show in the next section - are distressingly inadequate. (Cf Braithwaite, 2002: 
565-567; Mujuzi, 2003: 166-169)
The same applies to instances of a less serious nature where formal disciplinary 
proceedings are not held. The Schools Act deals only with the drafting of the code of conduct, 
formal disciplinary hearings, search and seizures, the suspension and expulsion of learners 
after serious misconduct, and the prohibition of corporal punishment. There are no legislative 
provisions regarding informal discipline in schools, except that the SGB is responsible 
for the drafting of the code of conduct after consultation with various stakeholders. Since 
most educators are still inclined to apply a punitive and retributive approach to discipline, 
the question arises whether this approach is in the best interests of learners and therefore, 
whether they live up to the constitutional standard. Learners are often sent out of class, put in 
detention, compelled to do community service, do additional homework or have other forms 
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of punishment imposed without the underlying reasons for the misconduct being addressed. 
(Burton, 2008:28-30; De Wet, 2003:116; SAHRC, 2008:13; Wolhuter & Van Staden, 
2008:396).A retributive approach to discipline is not in line with the child’s best interests and is 
also not in line with the right to a basic education and the aims of education as contained in the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), (1989). In terms of section 28 of 
the CRC, State parties have an obligation to ensure primary education that is compulsory and 
free and are encouraged to develop and make secondary and higher education available and 
accessible. Section 29 of the CRC provides the aims of education and it is clear from section 
29(1) that the holistic development of the child is a primary consideration. Section 29(1) (b)-
(e) focuses on the child’s relationship with others. In essence, children should be taught to 
respect the human rights of others and should be adequately prepared for responsible adult 
life (Reyneke, 2013: 286-289).
The CRC, article 29 makes clear that the aims of education are much broader than the 
mere attainment of academic skills; it also explicitly requires State parties to ensure that 
children are taught acceptable social behaviour. To act in a socially acceptable manner is 
a social skill that must be taught. To punish children for not acting accordingly, without a 
concerted effort to integrate the teaching of acceptable behaviour into the same process, 
is to disconnect the disciplinary proceedings from the broader aims of education (Reyneke, 
2013:286-289). Furthermore, the failure to remove barriers to learning proper social skills 
through adequate support structures and measures for counselling is to deny children their 
right to education. Any disciplinary measure must be measured against the aims of education 
and if those measures do not contribute towards the holistic development of the child and 
teach the child to act in a socially acceptable way, it is merely punishment and therefore not 
acceptable. It is thus necessary to find alternative measures to deal with school discipline that 
are in line with learners’ right to education and in their best interests (Reyneke, 2013:286-289). 
The inadequacy of the existing provisions of the Schools Act to attain the abovementioned 
goals of education and discipline is further highlighted by the insufficient provision for support 
measures or structures for counselling in the legislation.
7. Insufficient provision for support measures or structures for 
counselling
Section 8(5)(b) of the Schools Act does prescribe that the code of conduct must make 
provision for “support measures or structures for counselling a learner involved in disciplinary 
proceedings”. Although this section ostensibly addresses some of the concerns raised in the 
previous section, and appears to heed the provisions of section 28(1)(c) of the Constitution 
regarding children’s right to social services, it is still not fully compliant with the best-interests-
of-the-child standard. Close scrutiny of the abovementioned section of the Schools Act reveals 
several flaws namely:
Firstly, there is some uncertainty with regard to the question whether “a learner” refers 
to the transgressor only or to other learners involved in the disciplinary proceedings. Other 
learners that might be involved in disciplinary proceedings are, for instance, witnesses or the 
complainant. 
Secondly, the obligation to provide for support measures or to provide counselling 
structures “for learners involved in disciplinary proceedings” is technically applicable only to 
instances of serious misconduct because a disciplinary hearing is held only in such instances. 
120
Perspectives in Education 2017: 35(1)
(Schools Act: s 9(1)-9(1)(A)) This is cause for concern because support measures and 
counselling structures are essential in the prevention of misconduct. Thus, learners have to 
misbehave before legislation requires the SGB to ensure that these services are available. 
In addition, it also only makes provision for learners involved in the disciplinary proceedings. 
This implies that these services are compulsory only for those learners who are part of the 
disciplinary process and do not include learners who are not directly involved in the disciplinary 
proceedings, but who are affected by the misconduct. Apart from being discriminatory, this is 
an infringement of the rights of child victims and third parties to have their best interests 
respected and protected, and, most importantly, promoted through support and counselling 
(Constitution: s 28(1)(c)).
Thirdly, although it is laudable that the code of conduct must include provisions regarding 
support measures or structures for counselling a learner involved in disciplinary proceedings, 
no guidelines are provided to indicate the extent of the required support measures or structures 
for counselling. “Extent” here refers to the nature of the intervention; for example, support by 
a life-orientation educator only or the appointment of a full-time professional counsellor. Since 
the extent of available support measures or structures for counselling is at the discretion of the 
SGB, the door for decisions that might not be in the learner’s best interest is inevitably opened.
Fourthly, the Act provides no indication of what types of training and expertise are required 
before counselling can be provided for learners (Cf Social Service Professions Act 110 of 
1978; Health Professions Act 56 of 1974). Interventions by lay people might not be in the best 
interests of learners and might even be detrimental to them.
Fifthly, the word “or” is used. Thus, provision for either support measures or structures for 
counselling are compulsory. If the SGB decides to provide support measures, but counselling 
is required in a specific instance, will support measures suffice? In addition, who should 
provide the support or counselling? If educators should provide it, are they properly trained for 
these purposes? Counselling structures should probably also include access to the services 
of professionals. To what extent, therefore, will the SGB be responsible for providing support 
measures or counselling services in the code of conduct if such measures or services are 
not readily available, for instance in rural areas? (Cf Jacobs v Chairman, Governing Body, 
Rhodes High School, and Others 2011 (1) SA 160 (WCC)).
Sixthly, although a SGB might be in favour of support measures or structures for 
counselling, financial constraints and the scarcity of skilled people and proper structures to 
provide counselling might have a negative impact on the provisions eventually included in the 
code of conduct. In view of these practical problems, the SGB might include only the most 
basic of support measures in the code of conduct. However, these measures might not suffice 
to address the needs of the learners and thus be inadequate to promote their best interests. 
This raises the question of the responsibility of the state, and of provincial departments of 
education in particular, to ensure that the necessary support measures and structures for 
counselling are available. Apart from the fact that the lack of these will not be in the best 
interests of the learners of a particular school, such a lack of support measures and structures 
for counselling are also a form of unfair discrimination, because essential support measures 
and counselling structures might be available to some children only (Constitution, 1996: s 9).
Matters are further complicated by the provisions of section 28(1)(c) of the Constitution, 
which states: ”Every child has the right to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services 
and social services.” Unlike other socio-economic rights, this section does not provide that the 
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child has a right to “access”, but that she or he has a direct right. In addition, these rights of 
children are not subject to the progressive realisation criterion applicable to socio-economic 
rights generally. Furthermore, children are the only vulnerable group that has an explicit 
constitutional right to social services (Cf Constitution, 1996:s 26-27). Yet, it should be kept in 
mind that despite the lack of internal qualifiers regarding the availability of resources and the 
progressive realisation of rights found in other socio-economic rights provisions, this right is 
still subject to the reasonable and proportional limitation of rights found in the limitation clause 
(Constitution, 1996:s 36). However, if rights cannot be reasonably limited “the absence of any 
internal limitation entrenches the rights as unqualified and immediate” (Centre for Child Law 
and Others v MEC for Education, Gauteng, and Others 2008 (1) SA 223 (T):227).
This raises a number of questions: What do social services comprise in general, and 
in the school disciplinary context in particular? Which social services must be guaranteed 
by government to ensure that every child is in a position to enforce this right in the school 
disciplinary context? Are the departments of education at liberty to require schools to provide 
social services for learners, without financial assistance, in order to shoulder this responsibility 
of the state?
8. Narrow focus on the position of the transgressor
A retributive approach to misconduct and the implementation of an adversarial process to 
deal with it inevitably leads to a focus on the transgressor. The primary aim is to find the 
transgressor guilty and to punish him or her accordingly (Hopkins, 2002:145-149). However, 
misconduct also influences the best interests of victims of, and third parties to, misconduct. 
(Hansberry, 2009: 17) An overly narrow focus on the transgressor can constitute an undue 
dilution of the constitutional obligation to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the best interests 
of all the children concerned in a matter (Cf Head of Department, Mpumalanga Department of 
Education and another v Hoërskool Ermelo and another 2010 (2) SA 415 (CC):par 80).
The only explicit reference to the interests of other parties involved in disciplinary 
proceedings is to be found in section 8(5)(a) of the Schools Act, which deals with their due-
process interests. The provision distinguishes between the transgressor and “other parties”, 
but does not distinguish between the interests of adult “other parties”, such as educators, 
or children as “other parties”. One would expect there to be a difference between the levels 
of safeguarding the interests of children as opposed to the interests of adults. In addition, 
the paramount-importance requirement is applicable only to children and not to adults 
(Constitution, 1996:s 28(2)&(3)).
The impact of undisciplined conduct on other learners is often ignored or underplayed and 
should be properly considered in disciplinary measures to ensure that the best interests of all 
the learners are served. Failing to consider the best interests of the victims of and third parties 
to misconduct also constitutes an infringement of their right to equality and their right to dignity. 
(Constitution, 1996:s 9-10). The best interests of all children are equally important. However, 
the existing legal framework does not explicitly direct decision-makers accordingly, thereby 
risking an overemphasis of the best interests of the transgressing learner to the detriment of 
other children. 
The interests of non-transgressor parties are only acknowledged in a limited sense in 
section 8(5) of the Act. It requires the code of conduct to contain provisions of due process 
safeguarding the interests of the transgressor and other parties. “Due process” here refers to 
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procedural due process, which concerns the application of fair procedures. Substantive due 
process refers to the appropriateness and fairness of rules (Joubert & Prinsloo, 2008:130). 
This section thus only ensures that a fair process is followed. It does not explicitly oblige the 
SGB to ensure that all the other interests of all the learners in the school are also safeguarded 
and treated of paramount importance during the disciplinary proceedings.
9. The role of the intermediary
The way in which the Act fails to compensate for the adverse effects of the adversarial nature 
of the school disciplinary process, is also evident in the inadequate provision made for the 
protection of child witnesses in this context. Section 8(7) of the Schools Act provides that 
if a child under the age of 18 years will be exposed to undue mental stress or suffering 
while testifying at disciplinary proceedings, the SGB “may, if practicable, appoint a competent 
person” to act as an intermediary. However, a Constitutional Court judgement explicitly 
pronounces on the unacceptability of exposing children to mental stress and suffering during 
court proceedings (Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development and Others 2009 (4) SA 222 (CC)).
Research pertaining to the impact of the criminal justice system on child witnesses and 
child victims of crime indicates that being a witness and/or a victim in an adversarial system 
could be very traumatic for a child. In addition, children often find it difficult to articulate 
their case (Cassim, 2003:70-72; Clark, Davis & Booyens, 2003:43-44; Hollely, 2002:14-
15; Müller, 2003:2-9.). Different factors, such as language development, suggestibility, age 
and developmental stage, the child’s personality, and the trauma caused during the incident 
play a role in the quality of the evidence provided by a child. Expert knowledge is therefore 
necessary to elicit, understand and interpret the evidence of a child, especially that of younger 
children exposed to traumatic experiences (Louw, 2004a:3-15; 2004b:16-24; 2005a:19-28; 
2005b:18-27). Therefore, special measures, such as the appointment of an intermediary were 
put in place in the criminal justice system to support and assist the child during a trial and to 
prevent secondary victimisation as far as possible (Cf Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, s 
170A[1]: evidence through an intermediary; s 153: in camera proceedings; s 158[5]: use of 
closed-circuit television or similar electronic media; and s 164[1]: oath and affirmation. See 
also Cassim, 2003:70-72; Hollely, 2002:14-15; Davis & Saffy, 2004:17-23 on the effectiveness 
of court-support and court-preparation measures).
It is clear from case law (Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Minister of Justice 
and Constitutional Development, and Others 2009 (4) SA 222 (CC); Klink v Regional Court 
Magistrate NO and Others 1996 (3) BCLR 402 (SE); S v Mathebula [1996] 4 All SA 168 (T); 
S v Nagel [1998] JOL 4098 (T); Stefaans v S [1999] 1 All SA 191 (C); S v Francke [1999] JOL 
4451 (C); S v T 2000 (2) SACR 658 (Ck); S v Hartnick [2001] JOL 8576 (C); S v Malatji [2005] 
JOL 15716 (T); Motaung v S [2005] JOL 16071 (SE); Dayimani v S [2006] JOL 17745 (E); 
Van Rooyen v S [2006] JOL 16675 (W); S v Mokoena 2008 (5) SA 578 (T); Ndokwane v S 
[2011] JOL 27316 [KZP]) and criminal law regulations (GN R 1374/1993; GN R597/2001) that 
the appointment of intermediaries is a complex matter with several constitutional implications, 
and should therefore be properly regulated. Yet, there are no regulations with regard to the 
appointment, qualifications, experience, duties or training of intermediaries in the context of 
school disciplinary proceedings. Even more alarming is the fact that properly trained legal 
experts adjudicate the appointment of intermediaries in the criminal justice system, while 
these decisions are left to lay people in the school disciplinary context, without any guidance 
123
Reyneke & Pretorius Aligning school discipline with the best interests of the child
from the legislator. The best interests of children are therefore clearly at risk and the legislator 
should therefore follow the guidance provided by the courts in the abovementioned cases to 
align the Schools Act with the constitutional imperatives. 
Another worrying aspect of the provision is that an intermediary may be appointed “if 
practical”. This opens the door for discrimination against learners in, for instance, rural 
areas where there are fewer professionals available (Cf Constitution, 1996:s 9). Teachers 
and former teachers can act as intermediaries in terms of the criminal law regulation. Thus 
“professionals” will be available, but the impracticality lies in the fact that they will probably 
not be appropriately trained to act as an intermediary. Apart from the lack of training, there 
are also no guidelines to assist educators on what is expected of them in such a situation. 
The absence of a closed-circuit television (CCTV) system or a one-way mirror can also make 
it futile to use an intermediary (Reyneke & Kruger, 2006:87-89). No child should be exposed 
to undue mental stress and suffering while testifying. Nevertheless, the legislation and 
regulations do not make any provision for ensuring that this is practicable. Overall, this result 
flies in the face of the principle established by the Constitutional Court in Government of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 1 SA 46 (CC): par 44, that 
substantive equality requires responsiveness to differing degrees of deprivation in devising 
measures to realise access to resources. The most vulnerable and those who suffer the worst 
forms of deprivation should therefore be a special focus of such programmes.
10. Lack of exemption provisions
The retributive approach is characterised by authoritarianism and strict adherence to rules. In 
contrast to this position, the Constitutional Court found in MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal 
v Pillay and Others 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) that a one-size-fits-all approach to school rules is 
not compatible with the right to dignity since this right entails that one should be allowed to 
be who you are. Learners should therefore be allowed to apply for exemption from school 
rules if those infringe on their dignity or religious rights. It should be noted that the court 
requires these learners to motivate why they want to be exempted, not to punish them but to 
assist decision makers and other learners to understand their specific needs and beliefs. By 
allowing learners to express themselves during such an exemption process, learners’ right to 
participate in decisions that affect them is also given effect to. The Schools Act does not make 
provision for any exemption regarding adherence to school rules. On the contrary, section 
8(4) of the Schools Act provides that: “Nothing contained in this Act exempts a learner from 
the obligation to comply with the code of conduct of the school attended by such learner.” 
The Pillay case was decided in 2008 and the Schools Act was amended in 2011, but the 
legislator failed to use the opportunity to bring the Act in line with the prescriptions of the 
Constitution. The legislator therefore missed an opportunity to adhere to the prescripts of 
transformative constitutionalism and failed in promote and fulfil children’s best-interests right. 
11. Restorative discipline as an alternative
Despite attempts by the legislator to move away from a punitive and retributive disciplinary 
system, the legislation and the Guidelines for the Consideration of Governing Bodies in 
Adopting a Code of Conduct for Learners (“Guidelines”) do not really provide proper guidance 
on what an acceptable alternative to a punitive system should look like. Furthermore, the 
examples of acceptable disciplinary measures provided in the Guidelines (Cf par 10 of 
Guidelines) are still punitive in nature, and formal disciplinary proceedings are also very 
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adversarial in nature. Legislation and the Guidelines should be more instructive as to what 
would constitute alternative disciplinary measures complying with the best-interests-of-the-
child standard.
We started our discussion with the argument that the punitive, authoritarian and retributive 
approach to discipline is at the heart of the criticism against the existing provisions of the 
Schools Act. It is further contended that it is possible to address some of the criticism against 
the legislation by way of amendments but mere amendments would not significantly alter the 
punitive and retributive approach to school discipline. At the most, such a legislative approach 
can provide only limited respect for and protection of children’s rights, and only on condition 
that the legislation is carefully crafted and that those who are responsible for its implementation 
follow the prescriptions meticulously. 
As an alternative, the restorative approach to discipline entails a process that appears to 
be more aligned with a holistic and educationally attuned conception of the best interests of 
the child. The idea of restorative discipline is founded on the restorative justice philosophy 
that provides an alternative framework to think about wrongdoing (Zehr, 2002:5). Hansberry 
(2009:119) defines restorative justice as follows:
An approach to addressing wrongdoing (or conflict) that focuses on repairing harm. Unlike 
traditional (retributive) processes, justice is not achieved by penalizing or punishing 
wrongdoers, but through asking wrongdoers to take responsibility for the harm they’ve 
caused. Those harmed are asked to identify their needs. It then becomes the obligation 
of the wrongdoer(s) to make [an] attempt to put things right (restore) by responding to the 
needs of those harmed through symbolic or tangible actions.
In the school discipline context, the same restorative principles are used to address misconduct. 
This approach to discipline leads to the implementation of a process which respects, protects, 
promotes and fulfils not only the transgressing learner’s right to dignity, but also the dignity 
of everyone who is affected by the misconduct, such as the victim, third parties, and the 
educator. Unlike the retributive approach, this approach entails a process of deliberation and 
collaboration to find solutions to problems and to fix the harm caused by the misconduct 
(Hansberry, 2009: 21; Margrain & Macfarlane, 2011:19). It is also in line with children’s right 
to participate in matters that affect them (Reyneke, 2013). The restorative approach focuses 
on empowering children to know how to deal with a similar situation in future. Thus, the 
disciplinary process becomes firmly embedded in children’s right to education, which requires 
the holistic development of the child and specifically includes the skill to peacefully co-exist 
with others, to respect the rights of others and to solve conflict in a way that is compliant with 
the human rights of everyone involved in a matter. The restorative approach to discipline 
focuses on the needs and interests of everyone involved in a matter. (Hansberry, 2009: 21; 
Margrain & Macfarlane, 2011:19). From a children’s rights perspective, it means that the best 
interests of all the learners will be addressed on an equitable basis. If it transpires during the 
restorative discipline process that some of the participants need specific social services or 
other forms of support, the necessary arrangements can be made to ensure access to the 
required support (Vaandering, 2014: 66).
In contrast to the retributive approach, where the focus is on who broke the rules and 
what would constitute an appropriate punishment, the restorative approach emphasises the 
needs and interests of all children. This approach can be summarised by asking the following 
questions: What happened? Who was harmed through the unacceptable conduct? How can 
we fix the harm done? What can we do differently when confronted with the same situation in 
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future? This approach clearly seeks to uncover the needs and interests of everyone involved 
in a situation and to address it appropriately. It is also empowering since it teaches learners 
how to act differently in future. (Toews, 2006:21; Hansberry, 2009: 21; Vaandering 2014:66)
This approach to discipline requires schools to introduce mutually agreed to values that 
will guide the conduct of all stakeholders in the school community (Toews, 2006:23). The 
focus of this approach is first and foremost the prevention of misconduct through explicit 
efforts to develop relationships among everyone in the school community. If there is any 
transgression the process will focus on fixing the harm caused to others. The focus of the 
restorative approach is thus on building, maintaining and mending relationships which aligns 
perfectly with a human rights culture. A human rights culture is considered to be in the best 
interests of all children (Sprague, 2014).
12. Conclusion
The Constitution should play a decisive role in transforming the South African society in 
general and school discipline in particular to give effect to the constitutional values of human 
dignity, equality and freedom and to constitutional rights, such as the right to education, non-
discrimination, social services, and administrative justice. Real transformation is necessary to 
give effect to these Constitutional imperatives. 
A school discipline system characterised by punishment, retribution and adversarial 
processes cannot give proper effect to the transformative aspirations of the Constitution. It is 
evident from the discussion that the existing legislative provisions captured in section 8 of the 
Schools Act should be amended to address the highlighted shortcomings. These shortcomings 
impact on its ability to give proper effect to children’s best-interests-of-the-child right. 
Most importantly, the legislator should address the problem that lies at the heart of the 
criticism against the legislative provisions, namely the fact that it is fundamentally retributive 
and adversarial in nature. An opportunity to direct educators towards measures, such as 
restorative discipline that will rather respect, protect, promote and fulfil the best-interests 
right of children should therefore be seriously considered in any amendment to the existing 
legislative regime. 
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